A company manages 40 AWS accounts in AWS Organizations, grouped into a Development OU and a Production OU. The security team requires that no user in a Development account, including account administrators who hold full IAM permissions, can stop or delete AWS CloudTrail trails. Which approach enforces this requirement?
Choose one.
A restriction that must bind account administrators cannot live inside the accounts those administrators control. Service control policies are applied from AWS Organizations and set the maximum permissions for every principal in the member accounts they reach.
The SCP on the Development OU works because it is enforced at a layer no Development-account principal can change: it is inherited by each account in the OU, restricts member-account root users too, and denies the CloudTrail actions whatever the IAM policies allow. The IAM deny policy and the permissions boundary deny the same actions, but both are IAM objects inside the account, so an administrator with full IAM permissions can detach them. The Config rule is detective: it tells the security team that logging stopped instead of stopping the action.
- Classify the requirement: it is preventive and must bind administrators of the affected accounts.
- Ask who controls each option: IAM policies and permissions boundaries are managed by the account's own administrators.
- Discard detective controls such as Config rules when the requirement is to prevent an action.
- Place the deny above the accounts: an SCP attached to the Development OU is inherited by every account in it.
Exam tip: "No one in these accounts, including admins" means an SCP on the OU; anything managed inside the account can be removed by its admins.
Designing Secure Access: IAM Best Practices, Roles, and AWS Organizations — the lesson that teaches this.