A security review maps the path of a kubectl request that creates a Pod. Which crossing is a trust boundary that the cluster itself must defend with authentication, authorization and admission checks?
Choose one.
The API server is the gate where external requests enter the trusted control plane.
Every request from a user or workload is untrusted until the API server has authenticated it, authorized it and passed it through admission control. Later hops (API server to etcd, scheduler watching the API server) are internal flows between components that already trust each other and are protected with TLS. Image pulls cross a different boundary defended by registry credentials and image policy.
- Trace the request: client, API server, etcd, scheduler, kubelet.
- Find where an untrusted caller first meets a trusted component.
- Match it to the authentication, authorization and admission chain.
Exam tip: Client to API server is the front door: authenticate, authorize, admit.
KCSA Kubernetes Trust Boundaries, Persistence and Denial of Service — the lesson that teaches this.